يضم هذا الكتاب الأعمال الكاملة لندوة" نحو فلسفة إسلامية معاصرة"، والتي انعقدت لاستجلاء كيفية توظيف الفلسفة الإسلامية فكراً ونظريات ومبادئ ومقاصد في عملية إعادة تشكيل العقل المسلم، ومعالجة الأزمة الفكرية الراهنة لدى المسلمين، وإعادة بناء النسيج الثقافي الإسلامي- لعل هذه الأمة تستعد عافيتها وتسترد قدرتها- فإن هذه الأمة قد تخلفها وفي ابتلائها بالأزمة الفكرية لم يكن وحدها الخاسرة- لكن العالم قد خسر بانحطاطها الكثير.. فأمام علماء المسلمين كمية هائلة من تساؤلات العقل المسلم المعاصر، ومشكلات عويصة بعضها ذات جذور تاريخية ضاربة (...) في القدم تحتاج إلى دراسة وتحليل ولا بد من إعادة تقسيمها وطرحها.. وهذه البحوث والدراسات وإن صدرت متأخرة عن موعد انعقاد الندوة كل هذه الفترة، فإننا نأمل أن تكون قد أسهمت في إيجاد حل لجزء من هذه التساؤلات والمشكلات.. (shrink)

Two Arabic Travel Books: Accounts of China and India and Mission to the Volga. By Abū Zayd al-Sīrāfī, edited and translated by Tim Mackintosh-Smith; by Ibn Faḍlān, edited and translated by James E. Montgomery. Library of Arabic Literature. New York: New York University Press, 2014. Pp. x + 312. $40.

Islamic thought; Islamic philosophy; history; analytical study.

يضم هذا الكتاب الأعمال الكاملة لندوة" نحو فلسفة إسلامية معاصرة"، والتي انعقدت لاستجلاء كيفية توظيف الفلسفة الإسلامية فكراً ونظريات ومبادئ ومقاصد في عملية إعادة تشكيل العقل المسلم، ومعالجة الأزمة الفكرية الراهنة لدى المسلمين، وإعادة بناء النسيج الثقافي الإسلامي- لعل هذه الأمة تستعد عافيتها وتسترد قدرتها- فإن هذه الأمة قد تخلفها وفي ابتلائها بالأزمة الفكرية لم يكن وحدها الخاسرة- لكن العالم قد خسر بانحطاطها الكثير.. فأمام علماء المسلمين كمية هائلة من تساؤلات العقل المسلم المعاصر، ومشكلات عويصة بعضها ذات جذور تاريخية ضاربة (...) في القدم تحتاج إلى دراسة وتحليل ولا بد من إعادة تقسيمها وطرحها.. وهذه البحوث والدراسات وإن صدرت متأخرة عن موعد انعقاد الندوة كل هذه الفترة، فإننا نأمل أن تكون قد أسهمت في إيجاد حل لجزء من هذه التساؤلات والمشكلات.. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Der Islam Jahrgang: 93 Heft: 1 Seiten: 35-64.

In this study, the classification of Zaydī fuqahā’ that emerged in the mutaaḫḫirūn period of Zaydī fiqh and related terms are examined. The book named Bulūgh al-arab wa-kunūz al-dhahab fī-maʿrifat al-madhhab, which has great importance among the studies aiming to present the Zaydī fiqh accumulation as a uniform doctrinal structure was taken as a basis in the processing of the subject. After an introduction in which Zaydī fiqh studies are evaluated in their relationship with the subject, the issue is handled (...) under three main headings. In the first title, the author and his work are introduced, and in the second and third titles, the methods and terms used in the classification of the Zaydī fukahâ are examined. The author of the work is ʿAlī b. ʿAbd Allāh al-Shaharī (d. 1190/1776) who lived during the period of the Qāsimī dynasty (al-dawla al-Qāsimiyya) in Yemen. The most important feature of the work, which was prepared using many sources that were attributed importance among the Zaydī literature, is that it was the most comprehensive of all that had written on madhhab doctrine until then. The first part of the work explains that the right madhhab to be followed is Zaydiyya. In the second part, the classes of the Zaydī fuqahā’, which is the subject of our study, are explained. The fuqahā’ classes are primarily divided into two parts: al-salaf al-ṣāliḥīn and al-ḫalaf al-ṣāliḥīn. The first dates back to the beginning of the 3rd/10th century. This class is divided into two parts, as al-sābiqūn and al-mutaaḫḫirūn. The sābiqūn starts with ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib, his two sons al-Ḥasan and Ḥusayn and ends with the sons of twelve imams who are their descendants. Zayd b. ʿAlī (d. 122/740) is one of the twelve imams. The most important of the faqīhs in the part of mutaaḫḫirūn, which started with al-Qāsim b. Ibrāhīm al-Rassī (d. 246/860), are the six imams called ahl-al-nuṣūṣ or aʾimma al-nuṣūṣ. The reason why they are named as such is that their words were taken as a basis in determining the views of the sect on the field of uṣūl and furūʿ l-fiqh. al-Qāsim al-Rassī is at a point where all the knowledge of the Prophet's family and the principles agreed upon by sābiqūn, reach him through many channels. al-Hādī Yaḥyā b. al-Ḥusayn (d. 298/911), grandson of al-Qāsim, is the most important imam in terms of his position in the madhhab. The ḫalaf al-ṣāliḥīn is also divided into two parts as ahl l-taḥṣīl and ahl l-naẓar. The first part also referred to as muḥaṣṣilūn or aʾimma al-taḥṣīl, has no subcategories. The second part is divided into two sub-sections as ahl l-taqrīr and mudhākirūn. The muḥaṣṣilūn class starts with those who catch up with the last class of ahl al-nuṣūṣ and ends with ʿAbd Allāh b. Ḥamza (d. 614/1217), one of the three important imams. Two other important imams of muḥaṣṣilūn are Aḥmad b. al-Huṣayn (d. 411/1020) and his brother Yahyā b. al-Husayn (d. 424/1032). It is the fiqh activity of the jurists of this class, called taḥṣīl l-madhhab, that brought Zaydī fiqh, which was fiqh of imams (madhāhib l-aʾimma) in its first period, into a single madhhab and to its classical form in the last period. Mudhākirūn jurists lived at the same time as the ahl-t-taqrīr. This period is about 700 years from the beginning of the 6th/12th century, which is the last century of the muḥaṣṣilūn class, to the end of the 12th/18th century, when Shaharī lived. The roles of the ahl al-taqrīr in the madhhab mostly consist of reviewing the works of the ahl-l tahṣīl, approving the correct ones, and correcting the wrong ones. That's why they are so named. The author of Kitāb l-Azhār, Aḥmad b. Yaḥyā l-Murtaḍā (d. 840/1437), is one of the prominent jurists among the ahl l-taqrīr. The majority of Zaydi fuqahā’ belong to the muẕākirūn class. These are the lowest class of the ahl-al-naẓar. As an important result reached in the study, it is possible to express the following: There is a difference between some of the knowledge and opinions in modern Zaydī studies, which include the same subject as Shaharī's work, in terms of the classification of Zaydī fuqahā’ and the terms used. Therefore, the findings and conclusions based on this work should be confirmed by new studies on other Zaydī classics, and existing opinions on Zaydī jurisprudence should be reviewed. (shrink)

The contemporary Qur’anic studies have been marked by amazing development. Various methods and approaches to understand the Qur’an are offered by the scholars. One of the prominent figures in this field is Nashr Hamid Abu Zayd. Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd (1943–2010 M) is a highly controversial contemporary thinker. He is an Egyptian scholar who is accused of being apostate, because of his theory of qur’anic hermeneutic (the textual of Qur’an). This is reflected in his stances towards contemporary religious (...) discourse and the approach to reading religious texts, especially the Quran, which requires reading according to a hermeneutic mechanism. His books ‘Naqd al-Khitab al-Dini (Criticism of Religious Discourse)’ and ‘Al-Takfir fi Zaman al-Takfir (Thinking in the Time of Atonement)’ caused a great uproar in the early nineties of the last century. Abu Zayd was accused of criticising atheists because of their stances on the text. Therefore, this study aimed to discuss Abu Zayd’s position on contemporary religious discourse and his new approach to reading religious texts, and also aims to discuss why Abu Zayd’s theory has been string up Islamic world and ending by his expulsive from his native country. To deal with this problem, this article discusses Abd Zayd’s biography and some cultural framework of his people. The methodology of Qur’anic hermeneutic is the least his. Having examined the topic, the author finds that Abu Zayd believes that modem literary theory and criticism denote the way to understand and interpret the Qur’an ‘objectively’. The contribution of this research is discussing Abu Zayd’s contemporary religious discourse and his new approach to reading religious texts. Contribution: The contribution of this research is discussing Abu Zayd’s contemporary religious discourse and his new approach to reading religious texts. (shrink)

The history of mental illnesses is as old as human history. Mental disorders are affected by changing social and cultural factors during the historical process, and have been conceptually restructured and their definitions and classifications have been changed. The evolution of obssessive-compulsive disorders with roots as old as human history into modern concepts took place in the 19th century. The first scientific views on the spiritual origin of OCD belong to S. Freud. Freud observed that mental causes in OCD are (...) different from other mental disorders, and he examined obsession as a separate and specific disorder. Over time, it has been understood that OCD is a very common disorder. The American Psychiatric Association (APA) has classified OCD under an independent title in the latest version of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5) by removing it from the category of anxiety disorders. OCD is a mental disorder caused by mental actions such as obsessive thoughts (obsessions) and / or repetitive and compulsive behaviors (compulsion). The patient is often aware that such thoughts and behaviors are irrational and absurd. For this reason, he tries to get away obsessive thoughts that he finds contrary to his beliefs, opinions, moral values and logic from his mind. However, as he tries, obsessive thoughts become more and more frequent and create a great anxiety in the person. This time, the patient resorts to compulsions to alleviate the anxiety he feels or to get rid of it completely. As his compulsions repeat, his anxiety increases and he goes into a vicious circle. There are many symptom subgroups of OCD that seriously worsen the quality of life of the individual. One of these, and even the most overwhelming, is religious obsessions. It has been thought that there has been a relationship between religion and OCD for a long time in the psychology literature, and some remarkable studies have been conducted to clarify this relationship. Although there are many research findings showing that religion is an indispensable element in the protection of the mental health integrity of the individual, some forms of religious understanding and some experiences gained as a result of religious experiences may affect the concerns about OCD. This stage of religiosity is closely related to some sub-symptom groups of OCD. The explanations of the founder of the psychoanalytic method, Freud psychoanalytic method, and his followers made a great contribution to the understanding of OCD. However, since the psychoanalytic method exhibits a theoretically reductionist approach to religion, it is possible that the individual's devotion to religion is initially evaluated as a pathology or at least an important obstacle to insight. Today, cognitive behavioral psychotherapies are considered the most effective psychological treatment method for OCD, but their success rates in the treatment of religious OCD are low. Since religious OCD concerns often involve spiritual issues rather than concrete repeatable situations, behavioral methods can be quite difficult to apply in the treatment of religious OCD. Therefore, traditional psychotherapy approaches, even if they are not openly against religions, are insufficient to relieve the suffering in the lives of individuals with religious obsessions, as they generally neglect the religious dimension. Due to the vacuum that arises from restricting spiritual treatments to secular approaches, religious patients are threatened by the illegal practices of people who abuse religious feelings. Clinically, religious obsessions are more worrying and overwhelming. Therefore, their treatment is more difficult than others. Selective approaches that use different scientific disciplines together in the treatment of OCD and can stretch around religious beliefs and values can create more effective treatment models. Thus, the success rate in the treatment of religious OCD can be carried to higher levels thanks to the appropriate cooperation of the disciplines of medicine, psychology and theology. There is a rich religious cultural heritage that can support this collaboration in terms of theological disciplines. As an example, Abū Zayd al-Balkhī (d. 322/934), in his Maṣāliḥ al-abdān wa-l-anfus, probably made a clear distinction between neuroses and psychosis and classified neurotic disorders for the first time about ten centuries before Freud. In this study, the importance of approaching to religious obsessions as both a psychological disorder and a theological problem is emphasized. For this reason, cooperation of psychiatric and psychological approaches with spiritual counseling and guidance is recommended in the treatment of religious OCD. The difficulty in distinguishing whether the symptoms seen in a religious person are normal, natural religious thoughts and behaviors of religious life or abnormal appearances in the religious guise necessitates this interdisciplinary cooperation. (shrink)

One of the important domestic developments during the Umayyad period is the rebellions carried out by members of the Ahl al-bayt. After the rebellion of Zayd b. ʿAlī in Kufa, his father, Yaḥyā was intensely prosecuted by the governor of Iraq Yūsuf b. ʿUmar, so he moved to Khurāsān, where he would feel more secure and his supporters were located. In fact, ʿAbbāsids, Kaysānī and Zayd b. ʿAlī’s supporters were active in Khurāsān. Under these circumtances, Yaḥyā left Iraq (...) and followed the road Nineveh, Madāʾin, Ray, Nīshāpūr towards the east and came to Sarakhs and resided here about six months. Here, a group from the Khārijites came and made a revolt proposal, but this proposal was rejected by those with Yahya. After this, Yaḥyā continued on his way to the east and came to Balkh and he stayed until the death of the caliph Hishām b. ʿAbd al-Malik. The general purpose of Yaḥyā’s journey from Iraq to Balkh is probably to get rid of the prosecution of Iraqi governor Yūsuf, and to establish the appropriate political atmosphere for the rebellion by contacting the Ahl al-bayt supporters in Khurāsān. The governor of Iraq Yūsuf b. ʿUmar determined the location of Yaḥyā in Balhk, and he ordered the governor of Khurāsān Naṣr b. Sayyār that he ensured Yaḥyā was imprisoned in Marw. However, as his imprisonment was reported to the caliph al-Walīd b. Yazīd, he ordered him to be released. Governor Naṣr advised Yaḥyā to go directly to the caliph and avoid situations that could cause sedition. In this case, Yaḥyā first came to Sarakhs, and then reached Nīshāpūr via Ṭūs. Meanwhile, the Khurāsān governor Naṣr wrote a letter to the governors on the route and ordered them to follow the movements of Yaḥyā and to not allow him to stay in the cities for a long time. Yaḥyā did not advance further west from the city of Bayhaq because he was afraid he might be killed by the Iraqi governor. Therefore, he returned from Bayhaq and came to Nīshāpūr. Here, they confiscated the mounts of a caravan they encountered on the way along with seventy other people, but they also paid their fees. Due to this incident, the governor of Nīshāpūr sent soldiers to Yaḥyā and his entourage, but in the clash that broke out, the supporters of Yaḥyā were successful against the soldiers, who were more than them. Yaḥyā and his followers continued their movements towards Balkh in the east after that. Even though the sources do not fully state the reason for Yaḥyā 's movement to Balkh, the geographical distance and the possible Shīʿī potential in the region may have guided him. However, this time Yaḥyā aimed to reach Balkh via Herat and Jūzjān by traveling in the southeast direction, not via Marw. Upon the news that Yaḥyā reached Jūzjān, the governor Naṣr sent an army of eight thousand men on him. Yaḥyā had to fight against the Umayyad army with his small number of supporters, consisting of seventy or one hundred and twenty people. As a result, he and his supporters were killed. Yaḥyā's head was cut off from his body and sent to the caliph, and his body was hung over the entrance gate of the city of Jūzjān. There are some reasons why the revolt of Yaḥyā failed. First of all, Yaḥyā did not prepare a road map to follow in advance for the rebellion movement, and he could not communicate with a large mass of people and did not set his goal. Secondly, Yaḥyā did not have enough support to resist the Umayyad armies in the rebellion. As a result, we can conclude that Yaḥyā was hidden during the three-year period he spent in Khurāsān because he was under prosecution and therefore could not operate openly. In addition, he could not get enough support from the Shīʿī communities in the region. Although Yaḥyā's rebellion was unsuccessful, it had some effects on the peoples of the region in the following process. Especially the murder of Yaḥyā in Khurāsān helped to create a suitable ground for the ʿAbbāsid revolution. In addition, it ensured that all Shīʿī groups were gathered under the invitation of the ʿAbbāsid "Āl-i Muḥammad”. (shrink)

Un saggio in memoria di Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd , filosofo e teologo egiziano che ha contribuito in modo fondamentale alla diffusione dell’approccio letterario applicato al testo sacro dell’islam e al successivo sviluppo di un’ermeneutica di tipo umanistico in grado di affermare la portata rivoluzionaria e antidogmatica del concetto di Corano come insieme di discorsi. Nominato professore onorario all’Università di Leida, dove insegna a partire dal 2000, il professor Abu Zayd è costretto all’esilio nel 1995, dopo la condanna (...) per apostasia che gli viene mossa in ambito giudiziario proprio a causa del suo interesse per un terreno di studio così delicato.An essay written in memory of Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd , Egyptian philosopher and theologian who substantially contributed to the spread of the literary approach to the sacred text of Islam and to the subsequent development of a humanistic hermeneutics being able to affirm the revolutionary and anti-dogmatic significance of the concept of the Qur’an asset of discourses. Appointed honorary professor at Leiden University, where he began teaching in 2000, the professor Abu Zayd is obliged to go into exile in 1995, after his judicial conviction for apostasy due to his interest in such a delicate field of study. (shrink)

Whether God has a knowledge is a controversial issue both philosophy and theology. Does God have a knowledge? If He has, does He know the particulars? When we assume that God knows particulars, is there any change in God’s essence? In the theistic tradition, it is accepted that God is wholly perfect, omniscience, omnipotent and wholly good. Therefore, it is not possible to say that there is a change in God. Because changing is a kind of imperfection. On God’s knowledge, (...) another controversial issue is whether God knows particulars or not. Most of theist thinkers argued that God is wholly perfect; because of perfectness, He must have perfect attributes. Knowing and goodness are a kind of perfect attributes. Ignoring and evil are a kind of imperfectness. If God is perfect being, He should have the perfect attributes and must know the particulars. For me in this subject, there are some similarities between al-Ghazālī and Maimonides. In this study I took into consideration the idea of al-Ghazālī and Maimonides on this subject. Based on Griffel and Stroumsa’s argument, I tried to show similarity between al-Ghazālī and Maimonides on God’s knowledge. Summary: Whether God has a knowledge is a controversial issue both philosophy and theology. Does God have a knowledge? If He has, does He know the particulars? When we assume that God knows particulars, is there any change in God’s essence? In this study I took into consideration the idea of al-Ghazālī and Maimonides on this subject. Based on Griffel’s and Stroumsa’s arguments, I tried to show similarity between al-Ghazālī and Maimonides on God’s knowledge.In the theistic tradition, it is accepted that God is wholly perfect, omniscience, omnipotent and wholly good. Therefore, it is not possible to say that there is a change in God because changing is a kind of imperfection. On God’s knowledge, another controversial issue is whether God knows particulars or not. Most of theist thinkers argued that God is wholly perfect; because of perfectness, He must have perfect attributes. Knowing and goodness are a kind of perfect attributes. Ignoring and evil are kinds of imperfectness. If God is perfect being, He should have the perfect attributes and must know the particulars. Based on God’s immutability, some thinkers argued that God does not knows particulars. Particulars occurs due to the matter. Matter and its functions are continually changing. Therefore, to know the particulars requires changing in God’s essence. If God is the most perfect being, it is impossible that He is subject to affection. Thus, God does not know the particulars. Other thinkers, like Avicenna, argued that God knows the particulars as a universal way. For example, God knows only humanity and He cannot know Zayd as a particular person. al-Ghazālī criticizes Avicenna’s idea in Tahafut al-Falasifa (The Incoherence of the Philosophers) and argues that God is a perfect being and He should know particulars as a particulars. For al-Ghazālī, God should know everything, and His knowledge is different from our knowledge. In order to explain this matter, he says in Ninety-Nine Names of God;“But this can be understood only through an example. Perhaps you have seen the clock which informs one of the hour of worship. If you have not seen it, then, generally speaking, (it is constructed in this manner). There must be a mechanism in the form of a cylinder which contains a known amount of water. There must also be another hollow mechanism which is placed within the cylinder (but) above the water, and a string which has one of its ends tied to this hollow mechanism. The other end is tied to the part of a small container which is placed above the hollow cylinder. In (this container) there is a ball. Under the ball there is another bowl (placed) in such a manner that if the ball drops will fall into the bowl, and its jingle will be heard. Then the bottom of the cylindrical mechanism must be pierced to a determined extent so that the water can escape through it little by little…. All of this can be determined by a determination of the extent of cause which neither increases nor decreases. It is possible to make the falling of the ball into the bowl a cause of another action and this other action a cause of a third action, and to continue this process indefinitely so that from it are generated remarkable and predetermined movements (actions) of circumscribed extent. The first cause was the falling of the water in a determined quantity…. All of that happens in a determined quantity and to a determined extent which causes the determination of all of it by (adding at this point) the determination of the first movement which is the movement of the water. When you understand that these mechanisms are the principles from which movements must result, and that the movement must be determined if the result is to be regulated, then certainly that which has been determined must proceed from them….Even as the movement of the mechanism, the string, and the ball are not external to the will of the inventor of the mechanism -on the contrary, that is what He willed when He invented the mechanism- so also all the events which occur in the world, both the evil and the good and the beneficial and harmful, are not external to the will of God Most High. Rather (all of) that is the intention of God Most High for the sake of which He has planned its causes.” For Maimonides, as in al-Ghazālī, God is a perfect being and He must have the perfect attributes. Because of knowing is a perfect attribute, He should know everything, and His knowledge is different from human knowledge. In order to explain the difference between God’s knowledge and human knowledge Maimonides gives a parable in The Guide of the Perplexed. “Suppose a thing is produced in accordance with the knowledge of the producer, the producer was then guided by his knowledge in the act of producing the thing. Other people, however, who examine this work and acquire a knowledge of the whole of it, depend for that knowledge on the work itself. An artisan makes a box in which weights move with the running of the water, and thus indicate how many hours have passed of the day and of the night. The whole quantity of the water that is to run out, the different ways in which it runs, every thread that is drawn, and every little ball that descends -all this is fully perceived by him who makes the clock; and his knowledge is not the result of observing the movements as they are actually going on; but, on the contrary, the movements are produced in accordance with his knowledge. But another person who looks at that instrument will receive fresh knowledge at every movement he perceives; the longer he looks on, the more knowledge does he acquire; he will gradually increase his knowledge till he fully understands the machinery…Our knowledge is acquired and increased in proportion to the things known by us. This is not the case with God. His knowledge of things is not derived from the things themselves; if this were the case, there would be change and plurality in His knowledge…” As can be seen from above, when Maimonides is explaining the difference of God’s and human knowledge, he uses the same example what al-Ghazālī used. Even though Maimonides does not mention al-Ghazālī’s name in his works, it could be seen that there are a lot of similarities between al-Ghazālī’s and Maimonides’s ideas. Based on Griffel and Stroumsa’s argument, in this paper, I tried to show that there is a similarity between al-Ghazālī’s and Maimonides’s ideas on God’s knowledge. In my opinion, therefore, in the formation of Maimonides’s thought, as he thanks to Muslim philosophers like al-Farābī, Avicenna and Averroes, he also thanks to al-Ghazālī. (shrink)

This article aims to analyze the views of two pioneering Ḥanafī scholars, Abū Manṣūr al- Māturīdī and Abū Zayd al-Dabūsī, on the meaning of death and life in terms of their general doctrine of religion. In the first part, the general framework of Māturīdī and Dabūsī’s evidentialist conception of religion are drawn. In the second part, Māturīdī's views on the meaning of death and life and are explored. In the third part, the views of Abū Zayd al-Dabūsī on (...) the meaning of death and life, who establishes a striking connection between the divine order and existence, divine prohibition and non-existence, are examined, and a general evaluation is offered in the last section. Al-Māturīdī proposed a very original and systematic example of doing philosophy of religion, which still promising for the modern problems of the field, by opening the phenomenon of religion itself to discussion, and analyzing the nature and elements of religion. Māturīdī aims to place the problems on a universal and theoretical basis and to present a holistic, metaphysical understanding while discussing specific and particular issues in religion. Just as there are main notes in classical Western music that repeat throughout the symphony in baroque style, there are universal principles in al-Māturīdī’s metaphysics that cut all particular debates vertically. The basic principle of the al-Māturīdī’s metaphysics is based on this idea: God is a wise being, he does not do anything wise. Accordingly, it is absurd to create something to destroy; God did not create man to perish. The love of life and the fear of death are the deepest existential problems facing man as a finite being that goes towards death. Religion can be regarded as a powerful alternative to other worldviews to the extent that it provides a reasonable explanation for man’s deep concern about finitude. For al-Māturīdī, neither pessimistic understandings that emphasize only the fear of death nor hedonistic understandings that ignore death offer a reasonable solution. God created death as something that people fear the most and avoid, and life as something they love and desire. The testing of man is about being between the fear of death and the desire to live in the world. According to al-Māturīdī, this dilemma that man is facing also shows him the way out. If people do good and useful deeds because of their love for life, and avoid nonsense and ugly deeds because of their afraid of death, they can make their life eternal with their own efforts and escape from eternal/permanent death. The other Hanafī thinker, a philosopher of law Abū Zayd al-Dabūsī’s views on the meaning of death and life are parallel to Māturīdī's. According to al-Dabūsī, to test man, what God has placed in human nature is not only the soul and reason but also the spirit (al-nafs) and whim (al-hawa). While the spirit and whim invites man to the temporary by ignorance, it calls the soul and reason to the permanent by knowledge. The test for human beings is to choose between the temporary and the eternal life. For al-Dabūsī, man’s saving himself from falling into nothingness and gaining the eternal life depends on his use of reason. In other words, the reason binds human beings to life, and the whim leads them to nothingness. Drawing a parallel between reasoning and existence, ignorance and absence, Dabūsī defines the terms divine command and divine prohibition in a very original way. For him, the divine command is the things that must exist, and the divine prohibition is the things that must not exist. If the man helps exist the things that God wills to exist, he can make his own existence eternal. If the man helps exist the things that God does not will to exist, he puts himself into nothingness. Lastly, both for al-Māturīdī and al-Dabūsī, life is a divine grace bestowed on human being to gain eternal life through the good deeds he does at any moment. In short, reason is necessary in religion because its use is a preference of existence to non-existence. This metaphysical system, which sees goodness as a bridge from this finite world to heaven and eternity and makes a connection between faith and deeds on the ontological and ethical level is the essence of the worldview of the Hanafī-Māturīdī tradition. (shrink)

In legal methodology (usul al-fiqh), the problem of the defining istiḥsān and the legitimacy of its definition is among the critical discussion topics. To overcome the rigorism of law, istiḥsān was used by the founder scholars of Ḥanafī school of law and Malik b. Anas - however this use received various objections. Although the Mālikī scholars also used istiḥsān strong criticisms of istiḥsān have been directed on the Ḥanafīs. After the severe criticism of Muḥammad b. Idrīs al-Shāfiʿī, the Ḥanafī scholars (...) carried out various intellectual activities to define istiḥsān and to prove that it is legitimate. This process -which started especially with Abū’l-Ḥasan al-Karkhī and Abū Bakr al-Jaṣṣāṣ, revealed a rich accumulation with the contribution of the legal theorists in other school of laws. It is known that al-Karkhī's definition of istiḥsān has become widespread among the legal theorists, and the legitimacy of istiḥsān in the works of legal theory was based on his definition. Al-Karkhī's considerations on the legaliticamy of using istiḥsān can be traced in his student al-Jaṣṣāṣ, in the following centuries, Abū Zayd al-Dabūsī, Abū l-‘Usr al-Bazdawī and al-Sarakhsī’s works. Al-Jaṣṣāṣ' explanations on the legitimacy of istiḥsān begin with the criticism of Imam al-Shāfiʿī's against istiḥsān. He provides the proof of legitimacy for istiḥsān in divided two sub-headings. Al-Jaṣṣāṣ, who deals with istiḥsān in two parts as word and meaning, argues that there is no disagreement about the use of istiḥsān and that all mujtahids accept istiḥsān, and even al-Shāfiʿī, who opposes to the use of istiḥsān, employs istiḥsān in this sense. The type of istiḥsān on which there is a deabte is the istiḥsān used in relation to its meaning. Al-Jaṣṣāṣ states that this use is a qiyas operation; he justifies his point of view by referring to the works of Muḥammad b. Hasan al-Shaybānī. Indeed, when we look at how al-Shaybānī explained the istiḥsān’s examples in his works, it is seen that there are two conflicting juristic analogy (qiyas) made in many examples. Moreover, al-Shaybānī openly considered some types of istiḥsān part of qiyas by stating that some examples “can be included in this type of istiḥsān” Ḥanafī scholars wanted to break the hostile atmosphere toward istiḥsān by defining and evaluating the istiḥsān in a way that their opponents could accept. The definition of Istiḥsān “to abandon the judgment given to similar ones due to stronger evidence.” has been generally accepted. In this definition, istiḥsān is defined by associating with qiyas, and referred to an istihsan that is presented as the more substantial evidence, and qiyas is the weaker evidence. Although it is appropriate to define istiḥsān in relation to qiyas, the claim that in the definition istiḥsān is put in stronger place than qiyas might casuse to some the contradictions- in particular when the example’s of al-Shaybānī are taken into consideration. Because in most cases, when qiyas conflicts with istiḥsān, istiḥsān is taken. But in an opposite case, qiyas might be taken. Apart from these, there are examples of the types of istiḥsān that al-Karkhī has classified in the works of al-Shaybānī, but sometimes there are also strange situations such as taking the qiyas by istiḥsān. This also means that the term is not sufficiently defined. The negative attitude towards istiḥsān in some Shāfiʿī circles and the criticisms against the legitimacy of istiḥsān continued in the works of the fiqh method. Istiḥsān is defined as making a judgment without evidence by Shāfiʿī circles. Therefore, they did not accept the abandonment of qiyas, which is a sharī proof, because of istiḥsān, which is a non-sharī notable proof. Based on the examples given by the users of istiḥsān, Ibn Ḥazm, one of the Ẓāhirītes, claims that istiḥsān opens the door to arbitrariness. According to him, a situation that is accepted as istiḥsān according to Ḥanafīs can be taken as istiḥsān according to Mālikīs. This creates an apparent contradiction. There are some valid points in the assessment of Ibn Ḥazm. Because while it is seen that the istiḥsān of Mālikīs is criticized in al-Shaybānī's book named al-Ḥujjah, it can be also found that the istiḥsān of Ḥanafīs is charged in the works of Abū’l-Walīd al-Bājī, one of the Mālikīs. The criticism toward istiḥsān was continued by Shāfiʿīs such as Abū Isḥāq al-Shīrāzī, Imam al-Haramayn al-Juwaynī and Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī. While al-Juwaynī sees istiḥsān as a method based on the lust of the soul, not istinbat/legal deduction, al-Ghazālī understands istiḥsān as a personal comment. The main reason for the negative attitude towards istiḥsān is that the content based on the definitions, has been neglected most of the time. However, when we look at the works of al-Shaybānī, it can be seen that there is a proof of istiḥsān contrary to what is believed-and that this can be sometimes a work, sometimes a necessity, sometimes another comparison, or sometimes a custom. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Ghazali and Demonstrative Science MICHAEL E. MARMURA I MEDIEVALISLA_MICtheologians subjected Aristotle's theory of the essential efficient cause to severe criticism and rejected it. This criticism and rejection finds its most forceful expression in the writings of Ghazali (al-Ghaz~li) (d. 1111).1 In his Tahafut al-Falasifa (The Incoherence of the Philosophers), he argues on logical and empirical grounds that the alleged necessary connection between what is habitually regarded as the natural (...) efficient cause and its effect cannot be proven. He does not, however, take an agnostic stand on this question but proceeds to affirm two points: (1) that there is no causal agency in natural things; (2) that all natural events are the direct creation of God. Ghazali, moreover, does not confine such divine action to the realm of the inanimate and the irrational, in his al-Iqtis.~d fi-l-Ftiqad (The Golden Mean of Belief), he affirms the doctrine that the individual human act, like any other occurrence in the world, is also the direct creation of God. Causal efficacy resides in God alone. But the divine act, for Ghazali, is not an essential act. It does not proceed as the necessary consequence of divine essence. It is the arbitrary decree of the divine will, an attribute coeternal, but not identical with divine essence. Ghazali thus denies essential action altogether. In all this, he gives expression to the occasionalism of the Islamic school of dogmatic theology (kal~m) to which he belonged, the Ashcarite school. Ghazali had also a keen interest in logic. He wrote logical treatises for his fellow theologians, encouraging them to master this art as a tool to rebutt their doctrinal opponents. The~ treatises, in the main, sum up and explain the logic used by the Islamic philosophers--a logic that reflects the Stoic and Aristotelian traditions. Ghazali recognizes formal logic to be philosophically neutral, and hence in no way conflicting with his theology." He does not confine himself to formal logic in these expositions, however, but discusses Aristotelian demonstration. And it is in his statements on demonstration that we seem to be confronted with paradox. Demonstrative science, as understood by the Islamic philosophers, rests on the theory of essential causes and functions in terms of it. Indeed, in his reply to Ghazali's rejection of essential efficient causes in nature, Averroes (Ibn Rushd) (d. 1198) argues Texts frequently referred to in the notes will be abbreviated as follows: Demonstration: Ibn Sin~, Al-Shifa~; Logic V.; Demonstration, ed. A. E. Affifi,revised by I. Madkur (Cairo, 1956). Iqti~dd: A1-Ghaz~li, Al-Iqtisad Fi-l-ICtiqad(Cairo: no date). Metaphysics: Ibn Sin~, A1-Shif~: al-Ilah~yat (Metaphysics), ed. C. C. Anawati, S. Dunya, and S. Zayd, revised by I. Madkur (2 vols.; Cairo, 1960). MI: AI-Ghaz~lI,MiCyaral-CIlm,ed. S. Dunya (Cairo, 1961). TF: A1-Ghaz~ll, Tahafut al-Falasifa, ed. M. Bouyges (Beirut, 1927). TT: Ibn Rushd (Averroes), Tahafut al-Tahafut, ed. M. Bouyges, Beirut, 1930). 2 TF., pp. 15-17. [1831 184 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY that such a rejection would render demonstrative science impossible. We would have no true knowledge; at best, only opinion. 3For this staunch defender of Aristotle, the theory of natural efficient causality constitutes a necessary condition for demonstrative science. Yet Ghazali in his writings does not deny the claim that demonstration gives us certain knowledge about the natural order. On the contrary, he seems to be affirming this in both his Tahdfutand the logical treatise he appended to this work, Mi~jdral-CIlm(The Standardfor Knowledge).If Ghazali does in fact uphold this claim for demonstration, then he must either deny that the theory of essential efficient causality is a necessary condition for demonstrative science, or fall into contradiction. At first glance, Ghazali's position in the Micy~r,where he gives his most comprehensive treatment of demonstration, is highly ambiguous and suggests contradiction. He seems for the most part to be reproducing the essentials of the Aristotelian demonstrative theory. Although in one section he reaffirms his rejection of necessary causal connection in nature, he nonetheless continues to use such terms as "cause," "effect," "necessity" and "certainty" in what appear to be... (shrink)

Allegedly, according to Avicenna’s theory of God’s knowledge of particulars, God knows particulars in a universal way or universally. But, it is controversial how we should interpret knowing in a universal way. It seems knowing in a universal way is a black-box in Avicenna’s theological context. However, Peter Adamson in his valuable ‘On Knowledge of Particulars’ has suggested a novel approach to decode this black-box in Avicenna’s theological context. According to Adamson, the key for this black-box is embedded in Avicenna’s (...) epistemological context, i.e., Kitāb al-Burhān. It seems Adamson’s interpretation of Avicenna’s theory of God’s knowledge of particulars consists of two main steps. Firstly, on the basis of Kitāb al-Burhān, he tries to show that knowing in a universal way amounts to knowing syllogistically. For example, when, based on the syllogism “(I) all humans are animals, (II) Zayd is a human, and therefore (III) Zayd is an animal” one knows that ‘Zayd is an animal,’ one knows it universally. Secondly, on the basis of the first step, Adamson tries to show how we should interpret Avicenna’s theory. The upshot of Adamson’s interpretation is that God knows only essential features of particulars and not their accidental features. In this paper, I will argue that both steps in Adamson’s account of Avicenna’s theory of God’s knowledge of particulars face serious problems. (shrink)

The first eulogies (Qaṣāīd) about the Prophet Muḥammad (pbuh) appeared when he was still alive. Ḥassān ibn Thābit (d. 60/680 [?]), ʿAbd Allāh b. Rawāḥa (d. 8/629) and Kaʿb b. Mālik (d. 50/670), important Muslim poets of the period, praised the Prophet and inspired future generations of poets. Depending on the developments in the following centuries, there had been a great increase in the number of poems sung to express enthusiastic feelings towards the Prophet and to defend him and his (...) Prophethood. Andalusia is one of the places where this genre increased the most. The first examples of the praise of the Prophet appeared in Andalusia during the Mulūk al-Ṭawāʾif period (1031-1090). The praises of the Prophet, which were processed in the poems of asceticism, dirge and elegy until the end of the 5th/11th century, became an independent genre called al-Madāʾiḥ al-Nabawiyyah/Nabawiyyāt thanks to the ever-increasing Ṣūfī thoughts penetrating literary circles. The turning point of the praise of the Prophet in Andalusia, as in the East, is the period of the The Almohads (1147-1238), which coincides with the 7th/13th century. The mawlid celebrations, which were first initiated by the Fāṭimids in the 4th/10th century to give legitimacy to their rule, and held every year in North Africa on the twelfth of the month of Rabi'ulawwal, moved to Andalusia at the end of the The Almohad period and gradually became one of the largest official and religious holidays in Andalusia. Giving awards to high-quality poems read on the mawlid festival and celebrations made all over Andalusia has greatly contributed to the literary richness in this field. In praise of the Prophet, talented poets such as Abū Zayd al-Fāzāzī (d. 627/ 1230), Ibn al-Jannān al-Anṣārī (d. 650/1252), Ibn Jābir (d. 780/1378) and Ibn Zumruk (d. 797/1395) emerged. Abū Zayd al-Fāzāzī, one of the most distinguished Prophetic ode poets of the Almohad period is said to have first pioneered the spread of Prophetic praises in Andalusia before the Iraqi poet Yaḥyā al-Ṣarṣarī (d. 656/1258) and the Egyptian poet Būṣīrī (d. 695/1296). He has a dīvān called al-Wasā’il al-mutaqabbalah, which he wrote in alphabetical order and dedicated to the praise of the Prophet. The fame of the odes he uttered about the Prophet spread as far as North Africa, and it has become a tradition to read his odes on special days. Because of the abundance and quality of Prophetic odes, Ibn al-Jannān, who witnessed the glorious days and the collapse of the The Almohad state, also commemorated the poet Ḥassān ibn Thābit, The Prophet’s Odic Poet. Ibn Jābir al-Andalusī, on the other hand, wrote the second ode in this field after Ṣafī al-Dīn al-Ḥilli (d. 749/1348), the inventor of the axiomatic odes, and became the pioneer of axiomatic odes in Andalusia. The effect of political instability on Prophetic odes in Andalusia, which entered its collapse with the end of the Almohad state, is obvious. According to many poets, salvation from this plight of Muslims in Andalusia is possible by once again adhering to the Sunnah of the Prophet. Probably as a reflection of this idea, many poets from 7th/13th centuries onwards devoted their odes to narrating the Prophet and his Sunnah. Poets who describe the Prophet elaborately in their poems hope to be saved from the troubles they have fallen into and to reach the highest rank in heaven. Poets who touched upon the physical characteristics of the Prophet often likened his smiling face to a bright sun and a full moon. In terms of oratory, they stated that he had a fluent language and never uttered bad words. Andalusian poets, who praised the Prophet with moral virtues such as tolerance, justice and courage, stated that there was nobody more merciful and generous than him due to the abundance of his blessings resembling torrential rain. Andalusian Prophetic ode poets adhered to the traditional forms of Arabic poetry in terms of the structure of eulogy. In the introductory parts of odes, they generally express longing for the Prophet and the holy places. The main theme is mostly the Prophet and his outstanding virtues, and they usually end their eulogies with salutation to the Prophet. Save a few Sufi poets, it can be said that they used simple and understandable language in their poems. The sources of inspiration for their poems are the Qur'an and hadiths. Andalusian poets used non-material axiomatic arts in their poems without disturbing the structure of eulogy. In addition to the art of pun, they provided musicality in the poem with the ‘tent-frame’ meter and rhyme scheme, sometimes supporting it through repetition. It is possible to see all kinds of repetitions in, Ibn al-Jannān's odes. In this study, the place of the Prophet in Andalusia and odes, which are reflections of the love for him, will be examined. In addition, the concept of the Prophet in Andalusia will be explained within the political, social and cultural framework of the period. (shrink)

Taking a critical view of the dominance of postcolonial studies by South Asian and Latin American scholars and intellectuals, this article presents a newly emerging discourse among young Indonesian Muslim intellectuals, known as ‘Islamic Post-Traditionalism’. The specific question addressed in the present investigation is to establish to what extent this strand of Muslim thought can be considered a contribution to the engagement with postcoloniality and an application of deconstructionist discourse critique developed by postmodern philosophers within the context of rethinking religion, (...) and Islam in particular, in Indonesia. Identifying a vivid interest among Indonesian Muslim intellectuals in the work of pioneering and controversial contemporary Arab-Islamic thinkers such as Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd, Muhammad Abid al-Jabiri, and Mohammed Arkoun, this article will interrogate the influences exercised by these Arabophone and Francophone Muslim intellectuals on the formation of Indonesia's Islamic Post-Traditionalism and how this is reflected in this discourse. An illustration will be provided by a précis of the writings of a key exponent of the Islamic Post-Traditionalist discourse and an examination of a number of other contributors. (shrink)

Müksirûndan biri olan Abdullâh b. Abbâs 1660 hadis nakletmiş ve İslâmi ilimlerin farklı birçok alanlarıyla birlikte hadis ilmiyle temâyüz etmiştir. Kur’ân’daki incelikleri kavrayıp yorumlaması için Rasûlullah’ın özel duasına mazhar olan Abdullâh b. Abbâs, fetvaları oldukça meşhur fakih bir sahâbîdir. Rasûlullah’ın sünnetini anlamaya yönelik çabaları sahâbenin gözlemine bağlı olarak farklılık arz etmektedir. Ayrıca onların her birinin hadisleri anlayış ve kavrayışları aynı seviyede değildi. Bundan dolayı rivâyetler hususunda farklı anlayışlar, yorumlamalar, unutmalar ve yapılan hatalar sebebiyle sahâbe birbirini tenkit etmiştir. Büyük bir ilmi (...) birikime sahip olan İbn Abbâs sahâbeden mirasa dair nakledilen bazı rivâyetleri, uygulama ve fetvaları düzeltmiş ve onları tenkit etmiştir. İbn Abbâs’ın hayatına ve hadis, tefsir ve fıkıh ilmindeki konumuna dair çalışmalar yapılmıştır. Ancak onun ferâiz hususundaki istidrâkleri hadis ilmi açısından incelenmemiştir. Araştırmamızda onun hadis ilmi çerçevesinde Rasûlullah’ın sözlerinin ve uygulamasının doğru anlaşılması için mirasa dair yaptığı istidrâkleri ele alınmıştır. Abdullāh Ibn Abbās is one of the companions well known for his verdicts in the area of the Islamic law of inheritance and the abundance of his verdicts in jurisprudence. In this regard, the inheritance sections of the jurisprudence books often include Ibn Abbās's verdicts and applications. He approached the matters regarding jurisprudence from a different perspective, ruled differently from the companions, and provided corrections mainly in terms of the science of inheritance regarding the sayings narrated by the companions, applications and verdicts of the companions. In this regard, Ibn Abbās considered the jurisprudential aspects of the sayings and applications of Prophet Muhammad and made a ruling by interpreting the same narration by his wide understanding and knowledge and considering the meaning of the sayings. Ibn Abbās, who made different interpretations and evaluations in his corrections regarding the law of inheritance, objected to Umar Ibn Al-Khattab and Uthman Ibn Affan, criticized and corrected the narrations of Zayd Ibn Thabit. Ibn Abbās, who interpreted the matters regarding inheritance according to the principles of the Qur'ān, made rulings according to the apparent meanings of the related verses of the Qur'ān. (shrink)

Ancient Arabic literature dealt with linguistic sciences such as sarf, nahiw, belagha and Islamic sciences such as fıqh, hadith and tafsîr. This is known to the elite and the common people. But what is hidden and forgotten is that Arabic literature also includes the foundations and rules of modern sciences such as sociology and economics. Among the ancient Arabic literature is the writing of Maqamat, which holds an important position among the masterpieces of Arabic literature. For this reason, it is (...) important to study the writing of Maqamat from the perspective of the various disciplines of Islamic sciences and modern sciences. This study deals with fıqh and economic issues within the framework of Al-Hariri’s famous book, Maqamat. The aim of the study is to reveal the fıqh and economic aspects of Makamat writing through Hariri's Makamat as an exemplary study. The approach followed by the study is to select three maqama from Al-Hariri’s book, which contained fifty complete maqama, and to search for what is in them of fıqh and economics. Accordingly, the study includes three main headings, and in these three headings, fıqh, farâid (inheritance law) and economic issues are discussed, respectively. Although the science of farâid (inheritance law) is a branch of fıqh, it is singled out for mention independently because it has its own rulings. The study examined the jurisprudential aspect of the Maqamat in the thirty-second maqama called “the Tayyibi Maqamat,” the aspect related to the science of farâid in the fifteenth maqama called “the Faradiya Maqamat,” and the economic aspect in the forty-ninth maqama called “the Sassanid Maqamat.” The method followed by Hariri in her book is to present the issues in the form of stories through two fictional characters, Haris bin Hammam and Abu Zayd, whom she chose as mirrors reflecting the two opposing identities of the society. Abu Zaid appears in different forms and in various clothes. He sometimes appears as a beggar who deceives and a thief who betrays, and at other times as a preacher who advises and a scholar who guides. Rather, he is an imaginary character that Hariri put in place. Wherever he went, he met Al-Harith bin Hammam and the strange and adventurous incident begins, or he appears as a person from whom Al-Harith narrated the incident and the story. Harith is the person who always warns his against bad things, orders his to do good, and sometimes condemns his if he does evil. The results obtained in the study are, first of all, the determination that the Makâmât writing deals with the subjects of the science of fiqh as in the thirty-second makama and the subjects of the science of farâid (inheritance law) as in the fifteenth makama and the subjects of economics as in the forty-ninth makama. It is seen that some of the principles put forward by Adam Smith years later were also present in the Maqamat literature centuries ago. The fact that fiqh views are according to the Shafi'i sect shows that the Shafi'i sect was widespread in the region at that time. Additionally, as can be understood from the forty-ninth makama, there is also a profession of begging in the society where Hariri lives. The study also reveals the society's interest in, submission to, and acceptance of moral principles at that time, and shows that the Arabic language reached its peak during this period. (shrink)

In an anecdote in the Holy Bible, there is a rumor that because the Prophet David wanted to marry a woman named Bathsheba, whom he saw, he commissioned her soldier husband Uriah the Hittite to cause him to die in the most critical places of the army. In Islamic sources, some narrations originating from Isrāʾīliyyāt have been conveyed in many different ways. Likewise, in some Islamic sources, this incident, which is attributed to the Prophet David, was unfortunately also linked to (...) the marriage of the Prophet Muḥammad and Zaynab b. Jaḥsh. In addition, there is a claim that the Prophet Muḥammad sent Zayd b. Ḥāritha, who was Zaynab b. Jaḥsh’s ex-husband, to many wars and eventually caused his death in Muʾta war. First, the so-called incident between Prophet David and Uriah the Hittite will be discussed, and thereafter, Prophet Muḥammad and Zaynab b. Jaḥsh’s marriage will be thoroughly addressed in the study. In addition, it will be revealed that the incident that was attributed to the Prophet David was in no way similar to the incident of assigning Zayd b. Ḥāritha as a commander.Summary: According to a parable in the Bible, Prophet David sees a woman bathing while he was walking around the roof of his palace one night and he is impressed by her. Prophet David sends someone to investigate who this woman is, and as a result of the research, it is revealed that this woman is Bathsheba, the wife of Uriah the Hittite, one of the commanders of Prophet David. Prophet David sends someone to bring this woman and when the woman is brought to him, he commits adultery with her. The woman becomes pregnant after this affair and informs Prophet David about this situation. After receiving this news of pregnancy, Prophet David sends a message to the commander-in-chief, Joab, who is at war with his army, and asks him to send Uriah the Hittite to him. After hosting Uriah the Hittite in the palace for a few days, Prophet David sends him back to the front with a letter to be given to the commander-in-chief, Joab. In this letter, Prophet David asks the commander-in-chief, Joab, to send Uriah the Hittite to the most dangerous place in the war and to ensure that he is killed. Fulfilling the order stated in the letter of Prophet Davud, Joab sends Uriah the Hittite to a region where the war will be the harshest and causes him to be killed there. After the mourning of Bathsheba for her husband ends, Prophet David marries her. According to the Islamic belief, it is not possible for this incident to occur as it was mentioned in the Bible since the prophets were protected by Allah. It is because the parable states Prophet David committed adultery. In the Qur’ān, which is the source where we can get the clearest information about the incident, it is narrated inverses 21-25 of sûra Ṣād. Although there is a partial resemblance between the verses and the Bible, the verses do not mention either the woman or Prophet David’s sending that woman’s husband to the war because he wanted to marry her.In other Islamic sources, some relevant narrations originating in Isrāʾīliyyāt are narrated in many different ways. Our tafsīr scholars did not approve these narrations originating in Isrāʾīliyyāt. Also, they stated that the narrations expressing that Prophet David sent Uriah the Hittite to the war for his killing were not true and that such a situation would not be suitable for a prophet or even for a Muslim.In the same sources, many different possibilities were voiced in order to resolve the situation and this incident, which was attributed to Prophet David, was tried to be placed on a more reasonable ground. As a result of these efforts, the marriage of the Prophet Muḥammad and Zaynab b. Jaḥsh has been linked to this incident in various ways.Although it is not possible to give a certain date of the marriage of Zaynab and Zayd b. Ḥāritha, it is seen that this marriage occurred with the help of the Prophet Muḥammad in the first year of the emigration to Madinah. The marriage of the Prophet Muḥammad’s aunt’s daughter and Zayd, a freed slave, was for eliminating the discrimination between free individuals and slaves that existed in the society.There is not any serious problem about the marriage of Zayd and Zaynab at this point. However, at the point of ending this marriage, there are some narrations in our sources, and these leave the Prophet Muḥammad under suspicion. According to these narrations, the Prophet Muḥammad went to Zayd’s house to meet him and the Prophet Muḥammad called out to Zayd from outside the house. For not keeping the Prophet Muḥammad outside, Zaynab opened the door and invited the Prophet Muḥammad in by stating that Zayd was not at home although the clothes on her were not suitable. As soon as the Prophet Muḥammad saw her, he immediately turned his head and because he liked Zaynab, “I exonerate almighty Allah. I exonerate Allah that has turned the hearts.” he grumbled. After a while, Zayd came home and learned what the Prophet Muḥammad said. He immediately went to the Prophet Muḥammad and said “Messenger of Allah! May my mother and father be sacrificed for you. If you liked Zaynab, let me divorce her for you.” However, the Prophet Muḥammad advised him not to divorce his wife. As far as we can find in our sources, there are two other similar narrations.These narrations contain many problems in terms of both isnād and logical consistency. When we examine at the narrations in terms of isnād, we see that all three narrations are mursal. We can say that this is the first factor that reduces the reliability of narrations. Secondly, all narrations have at least one narrator accused of weakness or even dishonesty. Therefore, it is not appropriate to base a serious claim about the Prophet Muḥammad on such weak narrations. In addition, the rumor that the Prophet Muḥammad liked Zaynab, his aunt’s daughter and a married woman, and wished that she would divorce her husband has no reasonable logic. The fact that the marriage of Zayd and Zaynab ended quickly was mostly caused by Zaynab’s harsh temperament. Moreover, although Zaynab did not want this marriage, she could not oppose the order of the Prophet Muḥammad due to the verse about her. For these reasons, Zaynab could not get along with her husband and she was constantly reflecting her dissatisfaction with this marriage on Zayd. Therefore, Zayd constantly complained about Zaynab, but the Prophet Muḥammad gave Zayd the same advice every time, commanding “Keep your spouse with you, do not leave her!” Although the Prophet Muḥammad constantly banned Zayd, he could not stand Zaynab anymore and divorced her. After he divorced Zaynab, verse 37 of sûra al-Aḥzāb was sent down. Thus, the marriage of the Prophet Muḥammad and Zaynab took place as a result of a divine will.There is also a claim that the Prophet Muḥammad sent Zayd, the ex-husband of Zaynab, to many wars and consequently caused him to be killed in Muʾta war. When we examine the dates of the nine military expeditions, in which the Prophet Muḥammad appointed Zayd as a commander, it is seen that the first expedition was held on 3/624 while the others were held after 6/627. Therefore, at least eight of the nine expeditions in which Zayd served as a commander were taken place after the marriage of the Prophet Muḥammad and Zaynab. Consequently, in the light of this information, it is clear that the fact that Zayd was appointed as a commander is not similar to the situation in narrations about Prophet David. (shrink)

First, I argue for historical contextualization of the Qur’an as a given historical collection of discourses propagated by Muhammad as divine inspiration. Secondly, I argue for a distinction between the Qur’an and Islam, since the latter is the outcome of human efforts to construct their lives in accordance with what they understood to be the teachings of the Qur’an. The last point is to show how the role of Muhammad in his interaction with the communities of his time in Hijaz (...) shaped the Qur’an. So, the article is organized as (1) introduction; (2) the Qur’an and lslam; (3) the Qur’an and history: open hermeneutics; (4) Muhammad and the Qur’an; (5) the divine—human communication; (6) Muhammad: the first recipient; (7) Muhammad in the Qur’an; and (8) the community of believers and the need for legal regulations; followed by (9) conclusion. (shrink)